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POST-DISASTER RESILIENCE INCUBATION:
A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM OR A REALISTIC
POSSIBILITY?

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ABSTRACT

This paper mobilizes theories of the state, discourse and social innovation in order to critically examine the role of institutional structures – predominantly the state – in incubating resilience in a post-disaster housing construction context. The main ambition is to shed light on the ways institutional structures respond to the challenge of governing a heterogeneous and dynamic landscape of housing policy implementers, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic, who consider and implement 'recovery' in radically different ways, and who fight, discursively and materially, for their right to participate in the rebuilding experiment. The position, reposition, and constant presence of different housing policy implementers in socio-institutional arenas holds the potential to 'force' institutional structures to readjust their modus operandi, allowing thus for the possibility of new governance configurations which could also lead to more egalitarian post-disaster urbaninites. By empirically examining the recovery of New Orleans post-Katrina, we will better equipped to discuss the conditions under which resilience can be incubated.

KEYWORDS: Institutional structures, government, housing, recovery, social resilience cells, New Orleans

1. INTRODUCTION

Resilience is a powerful concept that has dominated the urban disaster scholarship over the last three decades (Wisner 2003; Pelling 2012; Davoudi et al. 2012; Johnson and Blackburn 2012, 2014; Blaikie et al., 2014). While it initially referred to the ability of an ecosystem to resist shock (Holling 1973), today the concept has evolved to encompass a more thoughtful understanding of what resilience implies. Resilience is now understood as a quality that is hetero-produced and hetero-acquired, meaning that the transformative potential of resilience is radically heterogeneous (Paidakaki and Moulaert 2016). This heterogeneity is manifested through various discursive and material practices, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic, which – individually and interactively – pre-determine and redetermine recovery trajectories in post-disaster urban contexts. This constant struggle takes place primarily on state and other socio-institutional arenas whereby various civil society actors interact with governmental authorities, elected officials and other institutions with the aim to promote and accommodate their interests and enhance their transformative abilities. However, this inter-organizational interaction and the critical role of the government in affecting final (material) outcomes, has been largely unexamined. To fill this lacunae, we focus on housing systems and examine the role of institutional structures (IS), predominantly the government, in providing or disproviding productive frameworks to different affordable housing policy implementers. In this paper, IS are defined as established organizations, public (governmental authorities), semi-public (public-sponsored enterprises) or private (foundations, faith-based organizations, banks), dedicated to the promotion of a cause or program, in our case of housing provision. Likewise, we treat housing policy implementers as 'social resilience cells' (SRC); namely non-governmental organizations, for-profit and non-profit, who mobilize different discursive and material practices to pursue, unfold and sustain their inherent resilience through housing actions.

In our effort to critically examine the macro socio-institutional arrangements under which post-disaster resilience can be incubated, we first mobilize a series of theories that will conceptually equip us to untangle the connections between power relations, social actions, and state interventions that ultimately drive governance models and steer resource trajectories. More specifically, our analytical frame is mainly informed by the work of cultural theorists (Jessop and Sum 2001; Sum 2006) who are interested in how *discursive practices*, namely practices of framing, narration and articulation, express relations of power linked to conflicts over material and cultural resources (i.e. housing) and hence serve to reproduce ideology (i.e. hegemonic visions of the 'ideal' post-disaster city). Cultural theory then comes into dialogue with the literature of social innovation (Moulaert, 2007) in order to deepen our understanding of post-disaster *material practices* initiated by a heterogeneous landscape of social actors. These alternative practices of resilience are material implementations of various understandings of 'recovery', and hold potential in altering (pre-) determined visions and practices of post-crisis 'resilient' urbanism. Finally, we mobilize state theory (Jessop 2007, 2012, 2015, Raco 2013, Johnston 1982) in order to better understand and clarify *state powers* in the current governance frameworks, and how these powers mold and remold various material outcomes in (post-disaster) urban contexts.

Against the background of this analytical frame, we empirically examine resilience incubation by putting a spotlight on the ways IS in the United States retransformed themselves in face of the post-Katrina rebuilding challenge. More specifically, we conducted qualitative research in order to critically examine the socio-institutional actions and inactions in response to a highly diverse and dynamic landscape of discursive and

material practices played out in the US post-Katrina. During field research conducted in New Orleans and Washington DC between March 2014 and May 2015, various types of documents (policy, planning, legislation, advocacy) were collected and analyzed. The textual analysis served as preparation for the semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted with IS (governmental authorities, think tanks, intermediary groups), SRC (for-profit and non-profit housing developers) and key interlocutors (urban specialists, local activists) involved in the post-Katrina recovery process. The interview questions were structured to reveal the various ways different IS have fostered, contained or thwarted different 'resilience' manifestations.

The paper takes the following analytical steps. In section 2. we introduce our critical approach to resilience seen through the lenses of housing systems. In section 3. we elaborate on our theoretical framework, and in section 4. we map the principal IS and SRC engaged in the US affordable housing arena. In section 5. we empirically examine how the powers held by the IS were activated in New Orleans post-Katrina. In section 6. we critically reflect on resilience incubation in light of the dynamic governmental interventions and socio-institutional transformations played out over the recovery years. Finally, in section 7. We start indicating conditions within which resilience can be better sought, fostered and sustained.

2. RESILIENCE, A POST-DISASTER HOUSING PERSPECTIVE

The concept of resilience was first introduced in ecological studies in the 1970s and was understood as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and return to its original functions in a timely manner (Holling, 1973). This 'bounce-back' understanding, while relevant when applied to robust engineering structures, fails to consider social complexity and evolution of urban human systems in disaster contexts. To address this limitation, the disaster scholarship embraced a 'bounce-forward' ability conceptualization of resilience. Resilience in this perspective is understood as a continually changing socially transformative process (Shaw in Davoudi et al., 2012) and a capacity to adapt future changes (Gunderson and Holling 2002). While this approach represents a radical change in perspective, two important questions remain unanswered: Bouncing forward into which direction? And whose transformative ability will be enhanced and whose will be undermined? To answer these questions, disaster theorists have put recently emphasis on the unbalanced power relations embedded in human systems, and the possibilities of powerful stakeholders sanctioning alternative opinions and actions by consolidating their own hegemonic social construction of 'resilience' (see also Davoudi, 2012; Cannon and Müller-Mahn 2010 cited in Davoudi et al., 2012; Kuhlicke, 2013).

To advance this discussion, we focus on housing systems and embark on the assumption that a post-disaster housing construction period can be a relevant political moment to start theorizing and operationalizing resilience into urban planning. We argue that the housing systems are a stage on which people set forward various transformations; a potential collective action paradigm for social changes (Turner, 1978). From one perspective, housing systems present an opportunity for progress in the functioning of the community, starting from satisfying unmet housing needs and discussing housing alternatives to bringing up the questions of human rights and changes in socio-political relationships (Johnson, 2011a; Sattherthwaite, 2011; Boano and Hunter, 2012), whereas from another perspective, they provide an opportunity for re-triggering processes of wealth accumulation. These different perspectives are taken up by three broadly-defined types of SRC: the pro-growth, the pro-equity, and the pro-comateriliazing. More specifically, the hegemonic pro-growth SRC consist of powerful local actors and institutions (for-profit

developers, realtors, bankers) working together to generate and extract *exchange values* through ongoing land-use intensification (Bull-Kumanga et al., 2003). These SRC define housing problems mainly by material standards, and housing values are determined by the material quantity of related products, such as profit or equity (Turner, 1980). On the other hand, we observe the counter-hegemonic pro-equity coalitions involving non-profit developers, neighborhood associations and civic groups who advocate primarily for *use values* and who are interested in preserving and improving the local quality of life (Pais and Eliott, 2008). Finally, a closely-related counter-hegemonic group consists of organizations engaged in co-materializing initiatives, such as homeless people's cooperatives, community land trusts, and grassroots rebuilding initiatives collectively erecting houses in 'solidarity' style (see also Satterthwaite, 2011; Biel, 2012).

What we contend is that all three broadly-grouped SRC have their own transformative capacities. Their differentiation – across and among them – lies in the ways by which they discursively and materially respond to questions like: For whom are we rebuilding? How do we provide for the housing needs of the displaced people? Who should rebuild? What civic principles are on the table that frame and push recovery processes forward? (Gutmann, 2006)

The discursive and material responses to these questions, and the position different SRC occupy in housing systems and state arenas, we argue, largely define the orientation of post-disaster urban redevelopment processes, and hence shape material outcomes. By viewing resilience through these lenses, the next sections aim to conceptually and empirically examine the nature and influence of diverse discursive and material practices, as well as the role of IS in responding to these practices and hence orchestrating (socially optimal) recovery outcomes.

3. DISCOURSE, SOCIAL INNOVATION, AND THE STATE: THEORETICAL INSIGHTS

3.1 Discursive and material practices

At the core of the theory of discourse is the concept of hegemony. According to Sum (2006), hegemony is understood as a political process in which dominant social forces – SRC in our context – articulate and try to impose a hegemonic issue framing that incorporates common elements drawn from the perspectives and interests of their associated groups. This process ultimately expresses relations of power linked to conflicts over material and cultural resources (Hall in Gotham and Greenberg, 2014). In this process, some interests and values are being more favored compared to others, especially when the dominant SRC utilize their cultural influences in order to establish and impose their views of 'what should be done' as a universal truth (Sum, 2006). More specifically, the symbols (freedom of choice) and practices (privatization, deregulation, flexibility) of neoliberalism – the current dominant ideology – are reproduced and become meaningful and partly legitimized in and through the urban process (Sum, 2006). The mainstream contemporary portrait of urban development depicts a 'new' urban economy promoting and justifying market-led development (Moulaert et al., 2007).

This dominant view and practice of the new urban development imaginary has been increasingly criticized by alternative SRC such as progressive social and political movements and (spontaneous) civic groups (Moulaert et al., 2007). These alternative SRC often articulate a wide range of different discursive pathways for urban redevelopment. These pathways are commonly grounded on themes such as grassroots mobilization,

neighborhood-based small scale projects, and quality of life. However, counter-hegemonic SRC often encounter difficulty to discursively challenge the hegemonic culture – and instead turn to material practices to express their desires and views. This possibility reveals that hegemonic discourse can also be challenged by material practices and proves that discursive practices are neither omnipotent nor self-fulfilling in practice (see also Moulaert et al., 2007).

Facing this persistent possibility of opposition, dominant SRC tend to constantly renew their rhetoric in order to maintain their hegemonic influence in urban affairs (Giroux, 1980 in Sum, 2006). This implies that hegemony is dynamic enough to incorporate new ideas and practices produced by challengers (Arena, 2012), but it also opens up new circles of cultural-dialectical processes with the formulation of counter-hegemony or discursive or material counter-action as living options. These processes never take place in a vacuum but often unfold themselves on various socio-institutional arenas, predominantly state arenas, with the aim to affect specific state actions. Hence, the precise role of the state in these inter-organizational interactions and the exact ways it orchestrates diverse forces need further conceptual investigation.

3.2 State power(s) and governance

Any investigation of a firm and determined role of the state in orchestrating post-disaster redevelopment experiments first calls for the need to clarify the undeniably messy concept of the state (Mann 2003). In the conceptual anarchy of state theory, the state has been variously defined, approached and analyzed. A long-standing analytical lense through which the state has been examined is that of the *unitary subject*. This translates into the state being understood as a monolithic institutional structure holding distinctive powers and socioeconomic objectives. Typical examples of such interpretation are the welfare state, the neoliberal state, and the sovereign state. More specifically, the welfare state is understood as an institutional structure that has a moral obligation to care for its citizens and a practical task of ensuring the proper function of society (Taylor 2003). The sovereign state is understood an all-powerful institutional structure that exercises intellectual, moral and political leadership to expand governmental reach and control its population through force and coercion (Jessop 2012; Whitehall and Johnson 2011) Finally, the neoliberal state is analyzed as a single institutional subject promoting privatization; a state-led process in which governments have gradually give up control of social services, and occasionally the ownership of state assets, to 'free market' forces through outsourcing, legal reforms, and the adoption of private laws (Passavant 2011, Raco 2013, Gotham 2012).

The state has also been theoretically approached through the multiplicity of its functions. According to Johnston (1982) the state is at the same time a protector, a facilitator, an investor and a bureaucracy. The state's referents vary much, Jessop (2015, p. 3) explains, because "the state itself changes shape and appearance with the activities it undertakes and the scales on which it operates; the political forces acting towards it, and the circumstances in which it and they act". This multiplicity of possibilities brings to surface a series of critical observations on the varied natures of the state (summarized in table 1.)

Table 1: State natures

Source: Jessop 2015; 2007; Shaw 2003

State natures	Critical observations
Complex institutional ensemble	States consist of almost discrete and generally disjointed apparatuses. Hence, there is no singular state power, but rather various potential structural powers or capacities instituted in the state as an institutional ensemble
Socio-spatially embedded	State structures do not exist outside spatial horizons but are embedded in wider socio-spatial arrangements. Hence, states are spatial entities which can influence and shape the geographies of socioeconomic activities, such as infrastructure investment and demographic movements, within a specific spatial and action context
Temporal and dynamic	State structures do not exist outside temporal horizons. States are dynamically evolving entities which temporarily develop and consolidate specific state forms. On one hand state forms are path-dependent and historically conditioned, while on the other hand, they are subjects of constant transformation. In this process of dynamic state building, slow fermentations of various kinds occur with multiple possibilities as final results
Socially related	State powers are relational. Their activation depends on the structural ties between state structures and their encompassing political system and complex web of interdependencies and social networks. The actualization of state powers, hence, depends on the action, reaction and interaction of specific social forces located both within and beyond the state ensemble pursuing particular interests in and through access to and control over given state capacities

The different natures of the state provide important revelations. What they essentially reveal is that there is no such a thing as a single state. What exists is an ensemble of public structures, part of a larger socio-institutional whole, which have their own unique powers activated through their interaction with external actors in different time and space contexts. It further reveals that through this interaction, public structures are subject to potential transformation. In light of these revelations, the dominant views of the state are revisited.

The 'free markets' of the small neoliberal state do not exist because their freedom depends on governmental rules, regulations, a legal and political framework which protects them from opposite forces, and provides a framework of effective function (Raco 2013, Johnson 2011b, Gotham 2012; Cullingworth and Caves). In any event, pursuing a 'minimum government' approach makes little sense because the electorate would not allow it. Elected officials often face the imperative by different social forces to "do something" (Cullingworth and Caves 2014), calling upon the activation of different state powers. The question is: "activate powers for whose best interest?" The state takes a neoliberal face when it promotes regulatory capitalism, namely the promotion of a for-profit business environment in which state-backed profits can be made (Raco 2013). These neoliberal facial features are further consolidated when this profit-oriented, market-mediated capitalist mode of production is discursively celebrated as 'formally adequate'. Such celebration may lead to a narrow range of policy-implementation possibilities whereby the main compass of action is risk calculation and not the citizens' well-being. Given the fact that since the 1980s, the state has largely rolled back from its responsibility to directly provide social services and goods to needed populations – and as a result allowed room for the private

and non-for-profit actors to fill this vacuum – narrowness in policy implementation may lead to an increasing number of unmet needs with serious societal implications.

However, the state develops its welfare characteristics when it ensures that social goods and services are sufficiently provided through the fair support of a wider network of public policy implementers. This perspective of viewing the welfare state is important because it advances the discussion on the 'right to the city' by focusing its lenses on the notion of 'egalitarian urbanity' (Johnson 2011b). With these lenses, the social welfare state is not only the state that achieves its political objective of delivering social justice in terms of access of the individual to social services and goods. The current political challenge for the 'Neo-welfare' state is to incentivise and finance a diverse landscape of development actors in the most socially just way, while at the same time securing equal access to services by all individuals. This challenge also implies that a 'more adequate' form of the state can be developed; one that takes the current regulatory capitalism and government by proxy (Gotham 2012) as a starting point but moves towards the direction of redistributing resources to a wider range of policy implementers. In order to empirically investigate this possibility – and how it can facilitate resilience incubation – we first map the principal socio-institutional structures and housing policy implementers involved in housing and disaster affairs in the US. We later analyze how these structures have responded to the post-Katrina New Orleans rebuilding challenge over the early and late years of recovery.

4. MAPPING THE US HOUSING POLICY

The housing finance system in the US operates in an environment shaped by the public sector. In this section, we first enlist the principal IS an SRC involved in the US housing policy, we present the US housing policy milestones and we conclude with the most recent funding trends.

Table 2: US Institutional Structures

Source: web, personal communication

US Housing Institutional Structures

| Federal public authorities	**The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)**: HUD's mission is to create strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality affordable homes for all. Principal programs HUD administers: Community Development Block Grants (CDBG, CDBG-DR), HOME (15% of grants to non-profits), Public Housing, Housing choice vouchers program, Section 4 (1993) (capacity-building grant for non-profits). HUD is required under their funds to pay special attention to the needs of the lower income people; HUD is involved in post-disaster recoveries for fifteen to twenty years **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**: assumes the task of assisting in disaster management. It administers the National Flood Insurance Program and Disaster assistance program (direct assistance to individuals, families and businesses in an area whose property has been damaged or destroyed). FEMA is income-blind with a strong built-environment focus. FEMA is involved with disaster recovery for two years maximum
State public authorities	**State Housing Finance Agencies** administer the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, the Tax-exempt Private Activity Bond (PAB) program, New market tax credit, historic credits, other programs (Housing Trust Fund). The LIHTC program is used by developers to raise private equity in order to fund the repair or new construction of affordable rental housing (10% of the Tax Credit Ceiling must be set aside to qualified non-profits); the LIHTC property must remain occupied by low-income households for at least 15 years. The PAB program aims to enable lenders to support financially distressed properties (for example damaged by a disaster) **State Office of Community Development** administer, inter alia, CDBG and HOME programs; block grants give state governments more autonomy to develop their programs
Local public authorities	**Local Public Housing Agency (PHA)** administer public housing and housing voucher programs **Local Offices for Community Development** administer CDBG and HOME programs; block grants give local governments more autonomy to develop their programs **City Redevelopment Authority** charged with revitalization of underinvested areas
Charitable foundations	Organizations responsible for drastic social experimentation and restructuring across many societal sectors: grant and technical assistance providers (examples: Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation)

Think Tanks	Organizations that perform research and advocacy concerning various areas of public policy (examples: Brookings Institute, Mercatus Center, Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute)
Faith-based organizations	Organizations with mission based on social and religious values (examples: Habitat for Humanity, Episcopal Relief & Development)
Financial institutions	Banks are regulated by the federal housing finance agency and through the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA 1977) are required to reinvest in communities where they get their deposits from
National non-profit financial intermediaries	Grant/loan/technical assistance providers seen as better able to identify and support local community organizations (examples: Enterprise Community Partners, Local Initiatives Support Corporation, Living Cities)

Table 3: US housing policy implementers

Source: web; Smith 2008; Stone 2005

US housing policy implementers	
For-profit developers	Organizations which operate in welfare services and goods provision with the aim to produce returns to owners or shareholders; they have a heavy presence in the US local civic life; they tend to reap capital gains from the sale of the property or eventually change market-rate rents
Non-profit developers	Mission-oriented organizations involved in the provision of welfare services and goods with the aim to reinvest profits into the organization and/or donate money to serve their mission; Since the 1960s, non-profits have become significant political actors in recent US urban political history; committed to keeping their housing affordable to low-income households indefinitely; sometimes they are the only groups willing or able to construct or rehabilitate in the tougher urban neighborhoods

Figure 1: US Housing Policy Milestones

4.1 Funding trends

Over the last two decades, almost no new public housing has been built with federal-based subsidies. The promotion of block grants (CDBG, HOME) and the slow phasing out of categorical and highly centralized programs (public housing) reflect an increasing scarcity of federal housing subsidies and a concession of substantial latitude to state and local governments to devise their own housing programs (Schwartz 2015). However, block grants have been cut back sharply. Between 2004 and 2012, federal expenditures for CDBG and HOME funds have decreased by 28% and 60% respectively (Schwartz 2015; Cullingworth and Caves 2014). Given the fact that state and local governments do not have the fund-generating capacity to meet housing needs on their own – although some states design their own programs to facilitate housing development, often in the form of housing trust funds – an imposition of unfunded mandates on lower levels of government has largely contributed to a persisting unresolved crisis of housing affordability and urban financial plight (Cullingworth and Caves 2014, Peacock et al 2007; Schwartz 2015; see also Seidman 2013). Nonetheless, policy circles have continued attacking block grants on the basis of being too flexible for them to be able to determine the number of families that could be benefited under proposed funding levels Cullingworth and Caves 2014). Tax expenditures, on the contrary, have become attractive to policy makers because they are not subject to Congressional appropriations and hence do not count for governmental expenses. The low profile of this financing tool receives also less attention in mass media (Schwartz 2015).

Against the background of the US housing policy landscape and funding trends, we will now investigate the various ways principal IS of different administration levels interacted with existent and novel SRC in New Orleans over the early and long years of recovery, and examine therein possible socio-institutional transformations that could hold the potential in incubating resilience in the city.

5. POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS RECOVERY

5.1 Early recovery years (2005 – 2007)

5.1.1 Federal level

When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in August 2005, FEMA was the competent public authority dealing with the management of crises, including post-disaster recovery. At that time, FEMA was only part of a larger structure, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), established in 2001 with a military-oriented modus operandi. The relegation of FEMA to an agency with a narrower focus had eroded its capacity to coordinate and deliver resources to the Katrina impacted communities (Gotham 2012). This incapacity led to several failures, including the early heavy reliance on trailers and mobile homes and the rejection of alternative housing proposals which arguably contributed to the prolongation of the permanent housing recovery (ibid). This prolongation was further exacerbated by the Congress' hesitance to quickly channel extra CDBG disaster funds (CDBG-DR) appropriated in December 2005 to help Louisiana rebuild (Ohlsanky and Johnson 2010). This hesitance was justified on the basis of New Orleans' 'incompetence' to deal with large sums of money. In order for the Congress to ensure that the disaster funds would be sensibly spent, a recovery plan and a promise to reform city governance were required (ibid)

The challenge of post-Katrina redevelopment was further aggravated by they Gulf Opportunity Zone (Go Zone) Act, passed by the US Congress in December 2005 promoting tax-exempt private activity bonds and LIHTC to raise private capital to rebuild rental housing in the Gulf Coast (Olshansky and Johnson 2010; BondGraham 2011). According to Peck (2006), the Go Zone Act was largely the result of lobbying activities in Congress by the US conservative movement (the Manhattan Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation) which quickly pushed for a series of 'principled solutions to recovery (Lakoff 2002 in Peck, 2006) that favored the work of hegemonic SRC; namely the encouragement of red tape reduction and the promotion of the private's sector flexibility and creativity (Meese et al., 2005, 1 in Peck 2006)

The federal government finally played an instrumental role in the demolition and redevelopment of four public housing buildings which suffered minimum damage by the storm. HUD's decision was based on the rationale that public housing is dehumanizing and emblematic of urban poverty (Button and Oliver-Smith, 2008) and reflect the long-standing experimentation of HUD with the New Urbanism design elements (Gotham and Campanella, 2011). The decision to redevelop the former public housing into mixed-income developments with HOPE VI funding provided a momentous opportunity for the pro-growth SRC to accelerate and expand their longstanding plans for transforming public housing (BondGraham, 2011).

5.1.2 State level

Federal actions largely provided the framework for initiatives at the state level. In October 2005, the Louisiana Recovery Administration (LRA) was created by the Louisiana State government as a business-oriented agency to oversee the reconstruction effort bypassing the authority of local elected officials. The LRA with the aid of federal-level waivers was further able to eliminate income targets, public benefit requirements and public oversight from guiding recovery policies (Gotham 2015). $8 billion on tax-exempt bonds and $170 million in low-income housing tax credits were largely awarded to pro-growth SRC on a

first-come first-served basis without targeting communities and neighborhoods with the greatest damage and recovery needs. The lack of consideration to the sociospatial consequences of state decisions was also manifested with the introduction of the Road Home program; a compensation-based housing program favoritizing owners of higher-valued houses (Gotham 2015). In September 2007, the state of Louisiana took a first initiative to correct this unevenness by targeting half of its remaining tax-exempt bonds to the most heavily impacted areas (Seidman 2013).

5.1.3 Local level

Critical decisions on how to use recovery grants and tax incentives rested with state government authorities and followed state priorities. According to a highly-ranked public employee in the city's housing and community development office (personal communication, September 4, 2014), the city government was incapable to independently finance recovery because it had its entire tax base lost within 24 hours after the storm. In October 2005, the city announced plans to lay off 3,000 municipal workers (Martinko et al., 2009), with the exception of police and firemen and emergency responders. The fiscal crisis was aggravated by the city's bond downgrading to junk status (Olshansky and Johnson, 2010).

On top of the fiscal crisis, New Orleans was obliged to develop a widely-accepted reconstruction plan in order to qualify for the CDBG-DR funds (Nelson et al., 2007 in Seidman 2013). Due to conflicting goals, planning for recovery proved to be a long and burdensome process. More specifically, what was observed during the first post-Katrina months was the desire of powerful local actors and politicians to radically restructure the city's urban form and demographics (Olshansky and Johnson, 2010). Two weeks after the storm, the Mayor of New Orleans set up the so-called Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) commission, delegating a local wealthy developer to be the chair of the planning committee. This committee recommended the prioritization for immediate rebuilding of those areas that went through minimal damage and an evaluation of the feasibility for reinvestment of those areas that suffered more extensive damage (ibid). These recommendations sent out an ambiguous and controversial message: that New Orleans may become a blank slate ready for new forms of investment and planning. This message was strongly conveyed through a newspaper article that illustrated the message with the infamous 'green dots' on the city map (Map 1.)

Map 1: The Green Dot map

Source: Donze, Frank and Gordon Russell, Times-Picayune

The city council opposed the mayoral top-down outside-expert plan and called upon a neighborhood-led, counter-planning effort that focused only on the flooded areas (Seidman, 2013). However, according to the Deputy Director of the City Planning Commission, L. Alley, this made the people living in the driest neighborhoods feel neglected (personal communication July 25, 2014). In turn, both plans were abandoned and replaced by the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) which was mostly funded by the Rockefeller Foundation (Diefendorf, 2009). The UNOP plan encouraged people coming from the worst affected areas to relocate to planned 'cluster developments'. Clustering in areas that suffered the least flood damage was the rationale on which the city would ground the allocation of investment in terms of built and social infrastructure. However, this rationale was resisted by residents who interpreted it as a denial of resources channeled for their own severally-damaged neighborhoods. As a result, the plan was not actualized (Colten et al., 2008), and the city has been rebuilt to a large extent in an ad hoc, spontaneous and fragmented manner.

The the 'green dot' controversy as well as the demolition of the four public housing developments prompted an unprecedented civic activism (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014). This activism took various forms: protests, formation of neighborhood associations, development of neighborhood plans, development of alliances and strategic partnerships, alternative modes of housing production (collective rebuilding in solidarity style). The housing deficit and the pronounced need for housing rebuilding and rehabilitation rapidly induced also the growth of an impressive number of non-profit organizations, pro-justice and pro-comaterializing SRC (Broadmoor Development Corporation, Jericho Road Episcopal Housing Initiative, Project Homecoming, Project Home Again, Gulf Coast Housing Partnership, Providence Community Housing). In 2007, some of these SRC collaboratively formed the Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance[1](GNOHA) with the aim to create change in the Greater New Orleans community through public policy advocacy and public education placing a special emphasis on the needs of the most vulnerable in society.

Some IS were quick to respond to this newly-emergent local capacity. Enterprise Community Partnership (Enterprise) set up an office in New Orleans and started working with professional non-profits or with those owning land and property. According to M. Whetten, the Vice President of the Gulf Coast Enterprise Community Partners, Inc., the reason for them being selective with their partnered non-profits was the time constraints entrenched in the federal funds (personal communication, April 8, 2015). Enterprise assisted alternative SRC in accessing LIHTC in order to build big rental houses. The local office of community development, was also fast to respond to the needs of the newly emergent SRC by enacting in 2007 the soft second program; a funding tool deemed necessary by the alternative SRC for gap financing (N. Barnes, Executive Director of Jericho Road Episcopal Housing Initiative, personal communication, June 4 2014; Seidman 2013)

In a nutshell, the early recovery years were characterized by stronger bonds between hegemonic pro-growth SRC and well-established IS, path dependencies in housing policy, and over-reliance on tax expenditures to finance recovery (a tool more familiar to experienced, for-profit developers). However, some new socio-institutional arrangements aiming at fostering the work of alternative SRC are witnessed. In order to fully examine the

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[1] "The Greater New Orleans Housing Alliance is a collaborative of non-profit housing builders and community development corporations working to rebuild the housing stock available in the city of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina devastated the city's infrastructure" (http://www.gnoha.org/main/home)

potential for resilience incubation in New Orleans, we will now examine the extent to which path-dependencies were broken and IS have retransformed themselves over the late recovery years with an eye towards favoratizing redundancy in rebuilding actions.

5.2 Late recovery years (2008 – 2015)

5.2.1 Federal level

Mandated by the Post- Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, FEMA was required to revisit its military approach to disaster planning. As a result, the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) was introduced in 2009 in which social dimensions as well as a more clear division of labor between and across governmental levels are better articulated (A. Liu, Vice President and Director of the Metropolitan Policy Program at the Brookings Institute, personal communication, June 23, 2014) Under NDRF, the role of non-profits in disaster housing is specifically celebrated[2], and HUD – the most pertinent federal authority in terms of housing and community (re)development – gains a clearer mission assignment regarding housing recovery (Earl Randall, New Orleans Field Office Director US Department of Housing & Urban Development, Personal Communication, April 17 2015).

Over the late recovery years of New Orleans, two more federal initiatives indirectly guided some of its rebuilding trajectories. The first initiative was the creation of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) by the US Congress in 2008 to respond to the mortgage crisis and the consequent rapid decline of neighborhoods in terms of foreclosure and abandonment. Under the NSP, competitive grants authorized under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 were channeled to states, local governments, nonprofits and consortia of entities. New Orleans was awarded $29 million to produce affordable housing units. The second initiative was the introduction of the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative in 2010 intended to be a successor to the HOPE VI program. In 2011, the Housing Authority of New Orleans and the City were granted $30.5 million to transform one former public housing development, Iberville into a mixed-income neighborhood.

5.2.2 State level

The state government increasingly recognized the essential role alternative SRC play in the rebuilding process. This recognition can be traced in various documents, including the Louisiana homeland security and emergency assistance and disaster act[3] and the draft

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[2] "Recovery Support Functions involve partners in the local, State and Tribal governments and private and nonprofit sectors not typically involved in emergency support functions but critically needed in disaster recovery. These new partners may include public and private organizations that have experience with permanent housing financing, economic development, advocacy for underserved populations and long-term community planning" (Housing Recovery Support Function: https://www.fema.gov/recovery-support-functions)

[3] "The legislature finds the that resources of nongovernmental nonprofit organizations can contribute greatly to the state's formalized framework for implementation of the requirements of this Chapter. Inclusion of the efforts of nongovernmental nonprofit organizations in the state's emergency preparedness, response, and recovery plans to the greatest extent predictable is encouraged (http://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?d=452286)

consolidated annual action plan for housing and community development of 2014[4]. In 2009, the Louisiana government developed the nonprofit rebuilding pilot program[5] with the promise to channel $20 million to non-profits. In 2015, the Louisiana Housing Corporation adopted all GNOHA's recommendations on the creation of the new Homeowner Rehabilitation Program to fund the repair or reconstruction of disaster-damaged homes. The state Office of Community Development Disaster Recovery Unit also worked closely with GNOHA on the Action Plan Amendment 65 which allowed non-compliant Road Home grantees to eligibly claim interim housing expenses.

5.2.3 Local level

In the city of New Orleans, the long-term recovery challenges provided the opportunity to political and economic elites to promote a more 'entrepreneurial' urban vision. In 2007, the city government together with a regional economic development alliance (the Greater New Orleans Inc.) hired the International Economic Development Council to consult in the development and implementation of the public-private partnership (PPP) model (Gotham, 2012). In 2010, the newly elected mayor announced the creation of the New Orleans Business Alliance, the first formal PPP in the city of New Orleans responsible for urban rebranding. These prominent IS rebranded the city as a center for bio-sciences, software technology, and sustainable industries with the aim to attract and channel resources into the promoted industries (ibid). Under the new city administration, post Katrina recovery was restrategizied in various policy papers on the basis of a 'place-based' approach[6]. A reference to the importance of a place-based approach was also traced in an article written in 2010 by Kabacoff, the influential president of a local real estate company (HRI properties) and lead developer of the Iberville transformation. In his article online, Kabacoff celebrates the place-based approach as the pathway to build 'healthier neighborhoods' through targeting the right neighborhoods and strategically focusing public resources.

The implementation of this new urban imaginary of New Orleans put forward largely by the City government, ('place-based revitalization' strategy in the City's Blight Reduction Report[7]) the business lobbies (New Orleans Business Alliance) and the for profit real estate sector (HRI properties) has changed the city's demographics over the late recovery years. The city's rebirth caused the influx of young educated people seeking working opportunities in the city's promoted industries which has inevitably led to the generation of

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[4] "The State's strategy to address at-risk individuals takes into account the primary role of community-based charitable organizations and voluntary groups, alone or in partnership with local governments and public agencies, in establishing and supporting basic facilities and services for special needs individuals" (accessed at August 2014)

[5] "In hurricane-impacted areas, successful models have been developed by CDCs and other non profits to secure and leverage resources in order to meet the needs of homeowners to complete their rebuilding process... The state has long recognized the success of these entrepreneurial efforts and has sought to secure funding for these programs to continue their efforts to help homeowners recover (Action Plan Amendment 33 (First Allocation) – Nonprofit Rebuilding Pilot Program: http://www.doa.la.gov/OCDDRU/Action%20Plan%20Amendments/Katrina-Rita%20First/APA33_Approved.pdf)

[6] A highly-ranked public employee in the city's housing and community development office (personal communication, September 4, 2014) clarified that "the place-based approach is making sure that all government resources and private resources work together. For example, if the school system aims at building new schools in one neighborhood, and a medical operating conglomerate also targets the same neighborhood, then the city government will direct resources to make sure that all the necessary infrastructure (i.e. streets, sewage, drainage) will support the private investment that focuses on that area. This includes housing opportunities through the adjudication of vacant properties by the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA)". He added: "investing resources to fix houses in areas that are not close to schools and hospitals is a not part of the strategy".

[7] http://www.nola.gov/getattachment/Performance-and-Accountability/Initiatives-and-Reports/BlightSTAT/Blight-Report_web.pdf/

new urban ills, such as gentrification and internal displacement. According to N. Barnes and M. Ripple, Partner at the Architecture firm Eskew+Dumez+Ripple (personal communications, June 4 2014; August 25, 2016), the high rise in rents, property values and housing costs due to the inflow of relatively prosperous new inhabitants have priced out a significant portion of the community in several neighborhoods. In response to these new socio-physical ills, two phenomena emerge: the genesis of new housing tenure models, and the invigoration of GNOHA.

In 2008, the first community land trust (Jane Place Neighborhood Sustainability Initiative) was founded with the aim to experiment with the ideas of equity and real participation as well as new types of tenure in a neighborhood (B. White, founding member of the Jane Place Neighborhood Sustainability Initiative, personal communication, August 6, 2014).In 2011, another major CLT, the Crescent City Community Land Trust (CCCLT) was formed GNOHA has also grown in membership and policy influence.

In face of these phenomena, some IS developed an interest in bolstering the emerging and consolidated alternative capacity. In 2015, the Greater New Orleans Foundation [8] discursively celebrated the development model of CCCLT and decided to financially award the organization with the last sum from the Foundation's Community Revitalization Fund. In early 2014, the Foundation for Louisiana's TOGETHER Initiative funded GNOHA to initiate a community-led housing plan that would develop strategies for improving housing policies and increasing equity in New Orleans.

Likewise, public authorities have also become more open to a wider SRC spectrum. The City has recognized the importance of alternative SRC in the city's recovery and made the strengthening of neighborhood development corporations a principal goal in their Master plan[9]. In 2013, as the highly-ranked public employee in the city's housing and community development office disclosed, the City after partnering with Enterprise allocated 150,000 dollars of HOME funds to a select group of nonprofit housing developers for capacity building.

On a similar vein, the New Orleans Redevelopment authority (NORA) – the public authority charged with the revitalization of underinvested areas and the leading agent in implementing citywide recovery initiatives at the late aftermath of Katrina – initiated a series of innovative and inclusive interventions in the areas of housing affordability and disaster planning[10]. An illustrative example of such inclusiveness was the decision of NORA to apply to HUD as a consortium with non-profit developers in order to access NSP funds. NORA was awarded $29 million and oversaw the production of 425 affordable housing units massively developed by non-profits (A. Stroud, real-estate development consultant and Principle at the Urban Focus LLC Louisiana: personal communication, August 12, 2014).

Enterprise was also involved in the NSP program, as a technical assistance provider. Due to this involvement, Enterprise began to develop relationships with new, less experienced

[8] "With disaster funding coming to an end, we have to look at smarter ways to leverage our dollars so that more and more families in our community have access to affordable housing... By investing in the community land trust approach, we're committing to making—and keeping—homes affordable." (president and CEO of the Greater New Orleans Foundation) (http://www.gnof.org/greater-new-orleans-foundation-invests-1-million-to-support-long-term-affordable-homes-for-new-orleans-families/)

[9] Vol.2 Ch.5 Neighborhoods and Housing, http://www.nola.gov/city-planning/master-plan/

[10] "In 2014, New Orleans was officially selected to become a member of the 100 resilient cities network funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. NORA was chosen to coordinate resilience in New Orleans because it has a hand on implementation and hence, help the concept being applied on the ground" (J. Genova, Rockefeller Foundation 100 Resilient Cities Project Manager, personal communication, 15 April 2015)

nonprofits. As opposed to the early years of recovery, Enterprise has become more aware of the local context and factored two crucial realizations into their new strategies: 1) New Orleanians value homeownership, and 2) a lot of the city's housing stock is single family. As a result, Enterprise has started to work with single-family-housing builders and considered devising new instruments to finance these types of development.

Not only pro-justice and pro-comaterializing, but also pro-growth SRC have been explicitly acknowledged by various IS, including Enterprise and city authorities. The capacity of experienced developers in getting tax credits and other subsidies in combination with their understanding of the real-estate business have made the hegemonic SRC reliable actors in delivering needed material outcomes. As a consequence, according to the highly-ranked public employee, the city equally mobilizes the for-profit forces by incentivizing them with HOME or CDBG funds to produce affordable housing. Based on these distinctive capacities of the for-profit sector, Enterprise and city authorities have also encouraged partnerships between the for-profit and the non-profit actors.

To sum up, the late recovery years were characterized the professionalization of the housing movement and the discovery of 'strength in unity'. According to the president of GNOHA, A. Morris (personal communication, March 10, 2015) the housing movement has become more intelligent in negotiating with governmental agents and more decisive in co-constructing a housing plan that also introduces radical initiatives around halting gentrification. In response to an invigorated housing movement, governmental agencies and other IS have increasingly and variously provided improved frameworks for the alternative SRC to unfold their capacities. However, the question that still remains unanswered is the following: "how far the IS have gone to incubate resilience with an eye towards forming egalitarian urbanities?"

In section 6. we critically reflect on the potential and limitations for resilience incubation in light of the governmental interventions and socio-institutional transformations played out in the US regarding the recovery of New Orleans. Based on those reflections, in section 7. we start conceptualizing governance structures within which resilience can be better sought, fostered and sustained.

6. RESILIENCE INCUBATION; THE INSTRUMENTAL ROLE OF IS

Reflecting on the macro socio-institutional transformations in response to the post-Katrina housing crisis and the diverse and dynamic discursive and material practices played out by different SRC can reveal important lessons regarding the governance of recovery. For this purpose, we put together different views and our own perspectives on how the efforts of various SRC in New Orleans have been facilitated, stifled or contained by larger socio-institutional arrangements with the aim to critically examine the possibilities and the constraints of materializing 'resilience' in the US urban contexts.

6.1 Conditions bolstering resilience

The flexibility of some IS to adapt their modus operandi in response to a heterogeneous landscape of local capacities provides an important condition within which resilience can be incubated. The federal government was fast to respond to the failure of a centrally structure disaster agency to incorporate socio-spatial specificities and local knowledge. With the introduction of the NDRF, the federal government has shifted from a strong top-down military approach to recovery towards the direction of an improved inter-level agency coordination and interaction with external partners. As E. Randall explains, this new

partnership-based recovery model builds on a rationale that one's strengths is illuminated by the other's strengths, and hence provides a framework for a more enriched incorporation of diverse local capacities. The fact that HUD gained a more firm role in recovery mirrors a governmental shift towards better entangling long-term urban development with disaster planning, allowing the two agendas to develop strategic synergies.

Another macro-condition that fostered the diversity of housing actions was the geographical proximity between IS based in New Orleans or Baton Rouge and SRC on the ground. Due to this proximity, IS such as the LHC, NORA, Enterprise and the Louisiana Foundation, have been in the position to better apprehend and respond to the distinctive potential and limitations of a complex and wide landscape of SRC over time. Omissions in programs designed in the immediate aftermath of Katrina (see Road Home) were corrected, new housing programs became more 'tailor-made', and alternative housing models have been discursively celebrated and financially supported.

The existence of positive path-dependencies in housing policies also played an important role for alternative forms of resilience to emerge. Several incentives were in place to facilitate mission-oriented individuals and groups to form non-profits. The pre-existence of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, the separate pools for funding non-profits under the HOME and LIHTC programs, as well as the specific focus of HOME, CDBG and LIHTC funds on low-and-moderate income groups proved to be instrumental in providing fertile grounds for initial grassroots action. The already institutionalized role of intermediary actors (see Enterprise) to provide technical assistance and grants to non-profits proved to be equally beneficial for an increasing amount of local, mission-oriented, housing groups.

6.2 Conditions stifling resilience

While many positive socio-institutional arrangements were in place or newly formulated to foster resilience, a series of other arrangements worked as opposing forces. As K. Labord, the President and CEO at the Gulf Coast Housing Partnership (personal communication, August 29, 2014) explains, a structural condition that does not allow non-profits to fully grow is the fact that the real estate in the US is capitalized on a transaction-focused way. This means that many nonprofit developers end up being under-capitalized because they cannot access capital markets. Hence, for affordable housing provision to be sustained, governments need to intervene in the market with deep subsidies. A lack of a consistent long-term socio-institutional commitment to recovery, funding instabilities, the lack of deep subsidies provision, and the over-reliance on tax expenditures to finance recovery have become serious constraints for resilience incubation.

The absence of a generous welfare state in terms of grave and long-term material support has caused concerns regarding the future of some SRC and the affordable housing inventory in the city. This lack of commitment reflects negative path-dependencies in the US housing policy whereby direct deep subsidies have been replaced by the promotion of tax expenditures and a development model that is based on funding leveraging. The well-consolidated neoliberal features in the current housing finance structure has made the production of affordable housing vulnerable to private investors and priorities of charity

organizations. Unfavorable political environments can further exacerbate the levels of affordable housing supply[11], putting resilience incubation at larger peril.

7. IS RESILIENCE INCUBATION INEVITABY FRAGLIE? CONCLUDING REMARKS

Against the background of a disaster-induced rebuilding challenge, a diverse landscape of SRC and IS, and supposed scarce federal resources, the questions that remain to be answered are the following: "In what ways IS can ensure that manifested resilience can be continuously fostered and tested?" "Is resilience incubation a realistic objective, or a radically fragile and deceiving one?"

As we witnessed in the case of New Orleans, different IS have played a critical role in fostering to varying degrees and in various ways (discursively and materially) the resilience potential of different SRC. However, the incubation of manifested resilience remains yet to be seen. So far, resilience incubation has proved to be inevitably fragile because it is highly contingent upon funding inconsistencies, the nature of the political climate, and the gravity and sustainability of commitment by IS. It also stumbles upon vicious and rigid path dependencies in housing policy. The enhancement of the welfare features of the state in the forms of long term commitment in deep-subsidies provision and distribution across SRC – key components for resilience incubation – is not yet evidenced. However, it always stays a living option. The 'direction of the titanic' (aka state and other socio-institutional structures) could change over time if SRC are constantly present and (re)negotiate with IS the conditions under which egalitarian urbanities can be envisioned and materialized.

The challenges and the opportunities SRC face in their struggle to remain present in housing and socio-institutional arenas need to be further investigated. Putting magnifying lenses closer to the micro-physics of resilience; namely the history and evolution of different SRC, the level of their community embeddedness, their financial sustainability struggles, as well as advocacy practices, will shed more light on the complex realities of resilience on the micro level, and provide a more clear look on the blurred connections between the micro level initiatives and the macro institutional settings. This bottom-linked compass will help disaster scholars to better theorize post-disaster recovery governance, further informing the scientific and policy discourse on resilience.

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[11] Politics of fiscal authority came into full force after the Congressional elections of 2010 when the Republican Party regained control of the House of Representatives and narrowed the Democratic majority in the Senate (Schwartz, 2015, p.57)

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