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**VIOLENCE IN NEOLIBERAL URBAN PLANNING
A CASE STUDY OF RIO DE JANEIRO'S PORT
REVITALIZATION PROJECT**

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ABSTRACT

Processes of neoliberal urban planning, understood as a comprehensive governmental action, incorporate *violences* and result in the imposition of new political territorial units, impacting on citizenship formation. Taking the Porto Maravilha project as a case study, this paper offers an exploration of how security bodies, the municipality, and private parties work together to re-shape power structures and the urban political economy of Rio de Janeiro's Port Region. In anticipation of hosting mega sports events, Rio de Janeiro is currently going through accelerated parallel processes of urban transformation and pacification, respectively implying the implementation of neoliberal urban developments, and a change and strengthening of security and public order policies, particularly with the deployment of Pacifying Police Units in *favelas*. Drawing from a historical perspective of planning practices based on accumulation by dispossession, the paper connects current neoliberal planning with violent pacification and public order policies in the context of police and state-induced gentrification.

Results are drawn from a blend of ethnographic exploration of the field based on observations, and in-depth interviews with residents, policy-makers, police officers and other members of the civil society. The study shows how, effectively, both the pacification process in the favela Providência, and the Porto Maravilha Public Order Unit not only secure spaces within the favela and the surrounding areas for capital investment, but also reinforce historical forms of segregation, and control the productive lives of residents, attempting to turn them into model citizens.

KEYWORDS: neoliberal urban planning, revitalization, violence, security, citizenship.

1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to offer a fundamentally political and historically situated reading of the processes of neoliberal urban restructuring. The specific focus of the paper is uncovering the different types of violence that neoliberal planning incorporates. Such *violences* gradually emerge in a spectrum that goes from more direct forms of physical violence, through control, disciplining and security policies, to expressions of symbolic violence and cultural displacement. Beyond the building of new infrastructures, cosmetic and cultural changes or the political-economic restructuring, neoliberal urban planning imposes a new political territorial unit and rule over the governed populations living within the revitalizing parts of the city.

As I will show, this is the case of the Porto Maravilha waterfront revitalization project, the largest urban planning operation that is being deployed in the building of the Olympic City of Rio de Janeiro. The general narrative of the paper is structured in three main points:

- i) First of all, it aims at historicising the reproduction of the *violences* of urban planning processes that have existed (at least) since early colonial times in the 16th century.
- ii) Secondly, the current modalities of violent neoliberal urban planning are presented, with specific focus on the physical violence and disciplining capacities of these.
- iii) Thirdly, neoliberal planning is understood as creating a new polity, and (self)governable subjects living and acting within its boundaries. Both symbolic violence and the imposition of exclusionary citizenship agendas are instrumental to this endeavour.

The paper is structured into two main parts. In the second section I offer a theoretical lens through which I later analyse the study case. Through the analysis of empirical ethnographic data gathered from 5 months of fieldwork, third section illustrates how the Porto Maravilha Urban Operation violently penetrates the Port Region and imposes a political territorial order differentiated from the rest of the city of Rio de Janeiro, while reproducing historical *violences* and segregation. Furthermore, as I will show, the installing of a new political order also has implications for the formation of citizenship.

2. VIOLENCE AND PLANNING: AN ANALYTIC PROPOSAL

The present work is based on a theoretically-elaborated assumption: that historically, urban planning practices have represented a form of and been reinforced by state violence, principally enacted by police officers (state agents who embody the monopoly of violence). Furthermore, these violent practices have been framed, throughout history, by discourses of ‘fear’ and ‘security’ to manage and perpetuate segregation.

2.1 The historical violence of planning cities

The analytical frame developed in this article proposes three different ways in which violence and urban planning have been historically interrelated: first of all, urban planning was seen as an infrastructural form of policing, by creating wide neat spaces that facilitated surveillance and the ordering of populations. A paradigmatic example of such processes is the *Hausmannization* of Paris through the building of wide avenues enabling military control and replacing working-class dense quarters (Harvey, 2003). Previous historical examples are also found on the building of Spanish colonial cities or ‘reducciones’ in Latin America and the Philippines as domination mechanisms (Scott 2004; Gomà 2012) (in the

16th century. This is also the case of the building of African and Indian 19th century colonial cities, in which segregation through planning was a mechanism to exercise power *over* native populations, resulting in the creation of racialized spaces (Njoh 2009).

Secondly, planning processes were accompanied by violence both in the implementation or building phase —i.e. the destructive violence of demolishing ‘unclean’ areas of poor quarters— and the maintaining of the already built order through the violent enforcement of law by police officers and sanitary brigades (Harvey, 2003; McFarlane, 2008). And thirdly, violence in planning was not only expressed through direct coercion but also through symbolic violence, that is, “the subtle imposition of systems of meaning that legitimize and thus solidify structures of inequality” (Wacquant 1998, p.264). Through the deployment of different technologies of power (such as physical and legal-normative structures), city planners, particularly in colonial contexts, implemented what they conceived as solutions against the “fear of the contaminated city”, both for the sake of protecting the elites, as well as with the aim of ‘civilizing’ native populations by influencing their agency and subjectivity (McFarlane 2008).

Such examples derived from early colonial and modern planning of the 16th and 19th centuries show how the building and ordering of cities becomes an instrument of political violence that is used to control potentially subversive classes or problematic populations, be that native colonized peoples or the proletariat in industrializing Europe. Moreover, both in colonial and in modern cities, planning served the purpose of capitalist accumulation by violent dispossession: in the case of colonial cities by the evident domination of colonized peoples’ manpower and the resources of their territories; and in the case of Haussmann’s Paris, accumulation processes took place by the demolition of working-class quarters and the re-activation of real estate markets, the financialization of the building processes, and the promotion of a consumerist bourgeois lifestyle that followed (Harvey, 2003). Planning ideals shifted considerably with the rise of modernist planning in the 20th century, which crystallized in the *Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne* (CIAM). Although theoretically subordinated to ideals of material progress and integration of the working classes, the ideals of the CIAM, when implemented through planning reproduced the segregation patterns inherited from previous historical chapters, or even exacerbating the duality of cities in developing countries (Davis 2014), and the technicality of their design and implementation resulted in authoritarian practices that did not consider “the human factor” of building truly inclusive cities (Lefebvre, 1991).

When considering the way that British colonial officials addressed the question of the sanitation of Indian cities, McFarlane very interestingly asserts that planning “was not just the domain of government,” that expressed and made itself evident violently, “but was productive of government” (2008, p.422). Following this appreciation, I want to propose this reading for the subsequent historical expressions of urban planning, through which planners seek not only to dominate by sovereign force and violence, but to derive knowledge from populations under their rule, to “conduct [their] conduct” as the Foucauldian definition of governmental rationality is presented (Gordon 1991, p.2).

2.2 The coercive neoliberalization of urban planning

As studies on the geographies “actually existing of neoliberalism” show, the continuous processes of neoliberalization, although globally spread, have been particularly localized in cities which acted as “institutional force fields” for regulatory reform and experimentation (Brenner & Theodore 2002; Peck et al. 2013), as well as strategic arenas for capital accumulation (Harvey 2012). Gradually, cities around the world engaged in a neo-

Darwinian inter-urban competition to attract international capital, which is reflected in the move from a managerial government to copy-cat forms of entrepreneurial governance that would ensure a business climate (Harvey 1989; Robinson 2006). Place marketing, tourism promotion and revitalization of ‘degraded’ parts of the city, and the privatization (and depoliticisation) of planning functions through the creation of ad-hoc public-private partnership (PPP) consortiums (Harvey, 2005) are current expressions of urban entrepreneurialism. Moreover, following an ‘emergency’ logic to satisfy the market –rule of competitiveness the issuing of exceptional legislation that benefits private corporations (Vainer 2011) or the participation in mega-events that catalyse urban mega-projects implemented in a top-down authoritarian manner are examples of governmental strategies to implement neoliberal urban development schemes that oftentimes result in the building infrastructures that are not responding to the social needs of city dwellers (Kennedy 2015; Varrel and Kennedy, 2011; Rould and Lefebvre, 2013).

As in previous historical periods, the neoliberalization of urban planning is reliant on varied forms of violence. Parallel to the race-to-the-bottom in its welfare functions, states increased their coercive and disciplinary capacities through a process of securitization in order to “impose a market rule upon all aspects of social life” (Brenner & Theodore 2002, p.352; Goldstein 2010). Entering a “security paradigm” (Goldstein 2010), major cities of the world have undergone processes of visible militarization to respond to internal threats coming from what are conceived as dangerous population groups (Jaffe & Grassiani 2014). Moreover, the new military urbanism acts as an active force for the ‘creative destruction’ of urban pernicious environments (through demolitions, forced displacement, etc.), while “clearing new spaces for the exigencies of global-city formation” (Graham 2012, p.147). Militarization is also reflective of the revanchist trend to criminalize poverty and marginality (Wacquant 2010; Wacquant 2008). Such *revanchism* is often intrinsic to processes of urban revitalization of degraded working-class neighbourhoods, that result in violent forms of gentrification, by which poor or marginal populations are not only displaced by the effects of revalorization but also expelled from public spaces through police violence and surveillance, following zero-tolerance policies (Smith, 1996; Macleod 2012). Urban planning is in fact presented as “a spatial technology of domination,” that, through the means of regulations, infrastructural or cultural violence, is being mobilized in order to correct “spatial pathologies,” e.g. the appropriation of spaces for informal economic uses in cities of the global south, to *normalize* the behaviour of problematic populations, as well as devalue popular cultural practices that can subvert the ‘revitalized’ order (Rodgers 2012; Janoschka & Sequera 2016; Kamete 2013).

2.3 Producing legible spaces and governable subjects

Neoliberal planning, therefore, is not only productive of certain governmental practices, but also establishes a new *political order* in the parts of the city that have or are being revitalized. In that sense, the deployment of planning as a spatial technology of domination (Kamete 2013) has the double aim to solve “the problem of police,” that is, the coercive securing of the new sovereign neoliberal order, as well as creating a new *polity* in the territorial extension of the revitalized areas, with self-governable subjects that reproduce the practices of the model, non-subversive citizen (Gordon, 1991 p.11).

Rather than being ideologically-neutral, values and norms are attached to revitalized public spaces (Delgado, 2011). These define what uses are correct and virtuous, and what bodies can occupy such spaces, demarcating the line of what might be considered as *uncivic*, criminal or morally wrong, or, in other words, putting forward a citizenship agenda –a framing of ‘the good citizen’ as a “governmental instrument through which populations are

managed”(de Koning et al 2015:122). Beyond the specific norms and regulations, revitalized spaces are built as an ‘aesthetic arrangement’ formed by symbols, discourses, messages and representations that should be ‘readable’ in order to influence behaviour and homogenize subjects (Batista, 2003; Sequera, 2010). Normally, the *habitus* of middle classes is privileged, whereas the aesthetics, culture, productive and reproductive practices of poorer classes that occupied these spaces before turn to be seen as inappropriate (Chaskin & Joseph 2013; Sequera 2010), being “the strict ethics of ‘consumerist citizenship”” the only accepted (Macleod 2012). Differentiated citizenship (Holston, 1999) appears when certain individuals can adapt their lives to the framings of ‘good citizen’ expressed by planners and that materialize in the built environment. The other groups of city dwellers that cannot fit into the established tabulations are the victims of ‘urban hygienist global processes’ that target subversive behaviours, through the impoverishment of the physical experience of the city “in a bodily sense, when it comes to everyday ordinary practice” (Berenstein, 2013:287).

3. CASE STUDY: THE PORTO MARAVILHA REVITALIZATION PROJECT

3.1 Approaching the Field: a Brief Historical Note on Rio de Janeiro’s Port Region.

Following an international water-front revitalization trend and early attempts at revitalizing the Port Region during the 1990s (de Mello, 2003), it took only 6 months after taking office for the mayor Eduardo Paes to begin the Porto Maravilha urban operation (Werneck, 2016). The main aim of the urban operation is to repopulate a depressed region that had been gradually depopulated because of relocation of most of the port and industrial functions to other parts of the State of Rio de Janeiro (de Mello, 2003). Historically, although being attached to the city centre, the Port Region of Rio de Janeiro had been configured as a working-class and poor peripheral region, with most of its population employed as port workers (Lamarão, 2006). The aim of the revitalization is to incorporate or to absorb the Port Region into the city centre. Beyond creating a mixed land-use region combining residential with commercial uses, one of the central aspects of the Porto Maravilha is “rescuing” the cultural heritage of the region¹. Although it is true that, being an integral part of what Moura (1995) called the “Little Africa” of Rio de Janeiro, the Port Region was the cradle of the carioca culture (of which samba is its best known expression), when considering the past and the heritage of the Port Region is indispensable to have a look at the actual violent processes that accompanied the configuration of the Port Region as it was at the beginning of the 21st century.

The origin of the Port Region as a densely urbanized part of the colonial and modern city periphery is linked to the relocation of the slave port from the city centre to the Valongo (de Mello, 2003), where millions of enslaved Africans landed. Since that moment, in the end of the 18th century, the Port Region will be stigmatized by the hegemonic discourses of the elites, based on racial prejudices that considered it as being a poor insalubrious region, a dangerous focus of epidemics and potential revolts, especially after the abolition of slavery and the proletarianization of the industrializing region in the late 19th century (Lamarão, 2006). The region, therefore, was the target of colonial planning practices that, as reflected on the example of Indian colonial cities (McFarlane 2008) were based on demolitions of “insalubrious” collective housing (*cortiços*), increased police presence and violent enforcement of regulations related to “health”, and in general consisted of “biopower strategies on the periphery that, in one way or another, respond to ideas of problem-population, metaphor of contamination” (Batista, 2014:163).

¹ See the Porto Maravilha website for more details: <http://portomaravilha.com.br/english> (accessed 15/5/2016)

With the proclamation of independence, the end of the slave trade and after Rio de Janeiro became the imperial capital (later of the republic), there was a will from the ruling elites to overcome the colonial past of the city and transform it into a modern and civilized urban centre that could be mirrored with the European capitals of modernity (Lamarão, 2006). Through the means of what Batista (2014) called a ‘radical aesthetization,’ the Port Region, already in the mid-18th century, underwent several cosmetic and semantic changes (e.g. the building of the ceremonial Empress Pier on top of the Valongo Pier) with the aim of “creating an amnesic condition” to eliminate any living memory of the colonial port, with the memory and heritage of slavery being the first memory that was targeted for suppression. The burying of the heritage of slavery was completed during the dictatorial mandate of mayor Pereira Passos (1902-1906), remembered as “a tropical Haussmann” (Benchimol, 1992). Passos led the first government-centralized city planning efforts, through the means of massive demolitions and police repression, and was responsible for the building of embankments and infrastructures that completely transformed the spatial configuration of the Port Region, with a prolongation of its shoreline and providing with the infrastructural conditions for an industrial upgrading (Benchimol, 1992).

Although since 2012 the Porto Maravilha has officially incorporated the protection and promotion of slavery heritage (which it did not originally), activists from the black movement are sceptical about the approach that it has taken, for it being too superficial, framed as a tourist attraction with potential gentrification-inducing effects (Cicalo 2013). For members of the black movement, a proper treatment of slavery heritage should connect the historical facts with the current social imbalances that still exist in the Brazilian nation. Actually, many of the residents that I interviewed referred back to history when they were explaining why the favela of Morro da Providência had recently been the target of violent planning processes that I will introduce in the following section. The sanitation planning policies of collective housing demolition, the shortage of housing and the lack of state assistance to the massive freed enslaved population gave rise to the informal urbanization of hills, the building of favelas, of which Morro da Providência, located in the middle of the Port Region, is the first on in Brazil’s history. And historically, as Moura (1995) narrates, the culture and livelihoods of the emerging subaltern population had been treated with neglect, if not with violence coming from the side of the state.

3.2 The Penetration of the Urban Operation: Demolitions and Militarization

In one of my visits to Morro da Providência during fieldwork, I was walking through the favela with another Brazilian researcher and a favela resident², who is a member of the Residents Commission (*Comissão de Moradores*), an organised group of residents that resisted and fought against the forced evictions and demolitions that had started in late 2010. The resident was offering us (the researchers) a “tour” through the favela, showing us the remaining rubbles of the demolitions and evictions that had stopped two years before, in 2013, after the Commission had won a judicial process against the Municipal Secretary of Housing (SMH). The two of them were commenting on the irony of history: the first favela of Rio de Janeiro, which was urbanized precisely as a solution to the housing shortages and the demolitions of *cortiços* in the 19th and early 20th centuries, had recently been the target of demolitions as the city centre is expanding and the Port Region, due to the revitalization process. The original plan of the municipality, according to the members of the Commission, was to remove the 80% of the favela community, to open up spaces for new infrastructure in line with the Porto Maravilha project; according to the resistance member,

² For this research I decided to keep the anonymity of my respondents.

the rest would be gradually displaced due to the gentrification effects. As another resident had told me: “we are located approximately only ten minutes from the financial centre of Rio de Janeiro, the headquarters of large multinationals, the airport [...] Do you think they want a favela community nearby? That is the reason why they started with the removals.”

The public authorities never opened a dialogue or a participatory approach with the community to discuss the revitalization interventions that were going to be implemented, and how, as all of the residents that I interviewed in the favela told me. The municipality at some point before the interventions presented the infrastructural works that were already planned for the community, but the details of how the removals were going to take place were never revealed. The strategies of the municipality were misinforming the residents who had been targeted with removals (as they found the letters SMH painted in their self-build houses' facades) fact that generated fear and anxieties, and the exacerbation of fractures and divisions among community members, between threatened people and individuals who were in favour of the 're-urbanization' or supposedly working as agents for the municipality. Such internal fractures and fears are still palpable today, two years after the demolitions have stopped.

The alternatives given by the municipality to families that were removed (160) were either insufficient economic compensations (which did not allow families to stay in the revalorizing city centre) or the relocation in social housing further on the peripheries. The authoritarian approach that the municipality and the SMH demonstrated during the start of the Porto Maravilha urban operation follows the rule of exceptionality and emergency logics (Vainer 2011) to implement mega-projects that ought to be ready for the participation in mega-sports events. The prioritizing of building a cable car in Providência, rather than addressing more urgent demands such as the improvement of basic service provision like garbage collection and sewage pipes, needs that repeatedly expressed during community meetings is seen, by residents, as responding to the will to 'touristify' the Port Region and neglecting socially-oriented interventions. Moreover, in order to build the cable car stations the community lost its only public space, the Praça Américo Brum, where any type of community festivities used to take place. Also, prior to the building of the connecting cable car station near Central do Brasil (the railway station), an apparently accidental fire burned the *camelódromo* (the market for informal street vendors) down to ashes, a place where many residents of the favela used to work.

Beyond the demolitions and building of new infrastructures, and following the “metaphor of war as presented by Agamben”, another expression of the “planning in a state of emergency” (Vainer 2011) is the actual deployment of a Pacifying Police Unit in Morro da Providência. The implementation of this model of community policing is a city-wide process that has been largely criticized as not advancing the promised social development of favelas, but rather installing a 'police state' (Jones & Rodgers 2011) and, exacerbating the militarization of Rio de Janeiro in the face of the building of the Olympic city-model (CPCO, 2016). Nevertheless, in the specific case of UPP Providência, the permanent role of the military police takes on a differentiated role as it is located in the geographical centre of a revitalizing region. The UPP Providência was installed in the end of 2010, after the urban operation was announced on the media, and right before the start of the construction works and demolitions, what was seen, in words of a respondent as “preparing the terrain for when the construction works would come”. “After the Brute Force, the Construction Works” was the heading of an article published on the 19 March of 2016 by the largest Brazilian media conglomerate 'O Globo' making explicit in the body of the text how the installation of the UPP Providência was a necessary previous step for the start of the re-urbanization project in the favela (Daflon 2010). Although during the first months and year after the installation of the UPP there was decrease in the number of

deaths³, the permanent presence of the Military Police in Providência represents, as it is perceived by my respondents, the violent penetration of the state as well as representative of the “harmful” discourses that accompany the idea of integration of the favela throughout the revitalization process. Moreover, during the last year the number of deaths caused by direct confrontation between the military police and gang members went up to the levels prior to the pacification process, and at least one of the teenage victims was killed as a result of an extra-judicial execution that could be denounced thanks to the recording and uploading on the social media of the events by a witness, causing a big impact both in the national and international media. The deployment of the UPP is seen, by my respondents, as a way to enhance the presence of the state in the territory, given that, apart from policing, the UPP is a way to generate data and control social relations within Morro da Providência. As the public-relations responsible of the UPP had told me during my first visit to their headquarters, “the UPP does not only bring the presence of police, but also of the government.”

By way of conclusion, this section offers an interpretation of the start of the revitalization process in Morro da Providência as an example violent penetration of the state, both in terms of infrastructure building and governmental presence through the military police. This can be framed in terms of “infrastructural violence”, a notion developed by Rodgers (2012), which articulates on the one hand the physical violence of building infrastructure under the mandate of a despotic power, but also considers the penetration of infrastructural power capacities of the state to govern, control and reproduce the structural and symbolic violence that accompany the processes of urban restructuring.

3.3 The Creation of a New Polity: Governing the Population Problem

As I have shown in the previous section, beyond the coercive and disciplinary penetration of the revitalization in Morro da Providência, the implementation of the Porto Maravilha project, in fact, signifies the creation of a differentiated governmental space, a new polity within the boundaries of the urban operation which go well beyond the favela limits. This is reflected in the fact that the PPP that is implementing the project, has also been delegated the governmental functions (e.g. services’ provision) over the whole revitalizing region. Formed by two private companies (the VLT Consortium and the Porto Novo Concessionaire) and one public branch of the municipality which controls the operation (the Port Region Urban Development Company, Cdurp), the new governing conglomerate has a constant interaction with the security and public order institutions in the Region, that is, the Military Police within the UPP Providência, and the Municipal Guard of the new Porto Maravilha Public Order Unit (UOP Porto Maravilha).

In this context, police officers have a particular role that goes beyond the use of brute force, as the Military Police has also taken on a softer role, mediating between the PPP and favela residents during monthly community meetings. During such meetings, questions related to education understood as capacity-building of favela residents to integrate into the new economy were discussed, whereby police officers offered a safe space to land developers for expounding their project’s potential to individually benefit residents. Moreover, the meetings were useful for the governing institutions to indirectly present their citizenship agendas in two different ways. On the one hand, in their conversations and discussions they made evident what they identified as a “population problem”, that is,

³ As one of my respondents acknowledged, actually, the presence of the Police in the favelas was protecting residents from the Police itself, as most of the violent deaths in favelas were caused by Military Police lightning interventions which corresponded to the previous war-on-drugs policing model.

certain subjectivities, cultural practices, and behavioural patterns that go from ‘vandalism’ to informal vending and ‘illegal’ occupation of public spaces which did not correspond to the aesthetic and productive values of the Porto Maravilha project. On the other hand, they reinforced and supported examples of good behaviour of individuals that are adapting their lifestyles to the touristic and cultural economy that is being established in the region. An example that was repeatedly shown in the community meetings was that of the collective “Sabores do Porto” (the Port’s Flavours), a group of favela entrepreneurial women that, after taking professional qualification courses, and receiving the support of the Cdurp and Porto Novo, are being allowed to sell their goods in the revitalized squares outside from the favela, especially during events and festivities. Nevertheless, in the meetings they also complained about the licences to sell their goods in the revitalized spaces being too expensive, and facing several problems that current *camelôs* (street vendors) have on a daily basis. One of the members of the group though, told me that “we aren’t *camelôs*; we are artisans,” trying to distance herself from the negative connotations that a profession practiced by a large part of her neighbours in the favela, and in the city as a whole⁴. These meetings and the general deployment of a citizenship agenda reflect the existence of a symbolic and cultural violence, for they reproduce the historically entrenched relations of domination, in this case, based on the criminalization of subaltern lifestyles, generating systems of meaning that ultimately serve as a justification for other types of more direct or physical violence.

The symbolic violence of the categorization of right and wrong citizenships is, indeed transformed into more direct forms of violence with the deployment of diverse governmental technologies that control and monitor the correct uses of revitalized public spaces. A part from the installation of 55 new video cameras and the violence of hyper-security (Janoschka & Sequera 2016), the role of the Municipal Guard within the UOP Porto Maravilha is crucial to correct what are seen as “spatial pathologies” (Kamete 2013) in a way reminiscent of the “revanchist” “zero-tolerance policies” applied in other cities (Smith 1996; Macleod 2012).

During an interview with the Inspector of the UOP Porto Maravilha, he justified the role of the Municipal Guard without making any reference to their coercive capacities, and framing it as a way to promote “a pedagogy of citizenship.” According to him, residents of the region should learn and understand that now, the revitalized Porto Maravilha spaces, are a differentiated area that could not allow the existence of informal activities, putting the example of the circulation of informal transportation like the motorbike-taxis that go up to Morro da Providência. Moreover, he explicitly referred to the importance of having legitimacy, and pointed out to the existence of two legislations, the decree 17.1982 which allows Municipal Guards to clear areas in order to grant the constitutional right to free mobility, and a law of environmental protection of patrimonial-historical areas. The latter, according to the testimony of the president of the neighbours’ association, was used as a justification to violently expel and prohibit residents from the inner neighbourhood of Gamboa to practice “the tradition of fishing” in Praça Mauà, the square that today is a symbol of the revitalization project. Homeless people had also been the target of violent expulsion from another revitalized square, Largo São Francisco Prainha, as one homeless artist who had all his belongings thrown away had told me. Finally, there is the case of the street vendors in Travessa do Liceu, a small street located few meters away from Praça Mauà. They were forcefully displaced and their stalls were destroyed last August, right before the inauguration of the square, apparently because they were obstructing the circulation of pedestrians. The majority of them had been working on that spot for over 40

⁴ It is calculated that there are 60,000 street vendors in the city of Rio de Janeiro (CPCO 2015, pag.55)

years. As I could speak to two of them that were still resisting, they expressed their frustration of seeing that another new type of street vending was allowed, the fashionable so-called “food-trucks” (spelled in English).

The geographical advance of the revitalization works, according to the answers given by my respondents who were residents or worked in the region, has multiple meanings attached. On the one hand, almost everyone agrees that the revitalized parts look beautiful, have better infrastructures, and are also safer, thanks to both the new lampposts and the increased presence of public and private security agents who work for the new bars and cafés that are opening now. Nevertheless, at the other end of the spectrum of opinions, there is the felt fear of displacement in a broad sense: first of all, residents are concerned about the revalorization of property and rent prices in the region, which will eventually force some of them to move to peripheral regions. Secondly, the new cultural and recreational offer of the revitalized areas, where many arts-related events are taking place, is attracting an upper-middle class public who, being representatives of a “consumerist citizenship” also mark the displacement of working-class or poorer residents with a differentiated habitus and with lower purchasing power (Sequera 2010; Macleod 2012). Finally, the importing of a cultural and tourism industry (e.g. with the creation of the Porto Maravilha Creative District) is also seen as a threat for some of the cultural agents that have been already working (and some of them leaving) in the Port Region for decades, and that now feel that their work is being neglected as they are not properly included in the design and implementation of projects, or receiving the material or financial support they would need to remain in the increasingly valorised Port Region.

In conclusion, this section shows how the advance of revitalization, beyond the changes on the built environment, seeks to install a new governing order that will have a purposeful governmental impact on the ‘conduct of conduct’, that is, on the formation of governable subjects. In such a context there are two ways out for residents. The first is, to adapt and become an example of the model citizen that aligns with the regeneration project’s ideals, either becoming a good consumer and producer or an exotic cultural product to be consumed itself (by tourism). The second is to be displaced either by the socio-economic changes or the governmental mechanisms, from regulations to coercive forms of control that are being put in place.

4. CONCLUSIONS: CONTESTING THE ADVANCE OF REVITALIZATION

This paper sought to illuminate how the Porto Maravilha revitalization process, as an example of neoliberal urban operation, is deployed showing multifaceted expressions of violence, and ultimately implanting a new governing order that marginalizes subaltern populations and reproduces history of segregation. What I suggest, therefore, is that processes of urban restructuring should be interpreted considering the political dimensions of neoliberal urban planning as a way to create a differentiated territorial unit, or a polity that advances a definition of what type of citizen is welcome to occupy and dwell the revitalized areas.

Profiled as a first experimental Public-Private Partnership to manage such a large region of the city, the Porto Maravilha experience might serve as an example to follow for policymakers in future redevelopments taking place in Rio de Janeiro. In this context, the study sheds light over emerging structures of power that manage and control every-day lives of inhabitants at the local level, while questioning, in the end, what the effects of these governance practices on urban segregation and the formation of citizenship are. Future research on the Porto Maravilha revitalization process might focus on how the advance of

the still on-going revitalization is being contested, negotiated and resignified in an effort to make it more inclusive.

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